The quest for urgent solution to resolve the world liquidity problem has continued to generate enthusiastic debates among political economists, policy makers and the academia. The argument has focused on whether the World Bank Group was established to enhance the stability of international financial system or meant to enrich the developed nations.
Introduction
The International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank were established on the premise of proffering acceptable solution to the world liquidity problem with the ideal of finding common monetary measures, standards and rules acceptable to all countries of the world as means of enhancing free flow of goods, services and financial assets. Despite this plain direction and objectives, opinions have been divided on whether the IMF and the World Bank have been able to achieve the stated mandate, or they are bodies that serve other interests of the developed world economies (other than the objectives for which they were established).
According to Truman (2010) , the original thinking of its theoretical argument varied from the realities on ground. As it were, the IMF and the World Bank were created to stabilize the international financial system and solve the world liquidity problem.
The institutions emerged as a result of the conference of representatives of fortyfive (45) countries held in Bretton Woods, Hampshire in July 1944 (Zhongxia, 2013) .
The conference was unveiled to find solution to the world international payment system, since it became obvious that the earlier gold standard was rejected as a medium of exchange in the global market due to shortage in supply and significant increase in the cost of mining gold as well as lack of cooperation of the countries of the world (Ezeh, 2017) . By 1931, Great Britain was no longer converting its pounds to gold, which led to emergence of exchange rate restriction and protectionism among countries of the world (Braithwaite and Drahos, 2001) . To provide answers to the problem of liquidity, the delegates of the conference were charged with the mission of accomplishing the best alternative payment system that will be acceptable to all members.
The Bretton Wood conference presented two major proposals, which marked the formation of the IMF and the World Bank. The conference sets up an internationally agreed rules, conventions and supporting institutions that facilitate international trade, Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and enhance general reallocation of resources among nations. To accomplish this task, the conference made effort to provide means of payment acceptable between buyers and sellers of different nationality including deferred payment. To ensure that the credibility of this process is not in doubt, the conference made effort to provide enough liquidity for fluctuating trade and provided means by which global imbalance could be corrected.
Despite the sound theoretical appeal of the conference's outcome, recent realties of events clearly showed that there are many questions that demand answers. The need to review the basis for world trade became imperative when only few wealthy nations profit more from the current arrangement neglecting the welfare of developing nations as well as their macroeconomic and political imbalance. This study contributes to this ongoing debate in three-fold: first, it reviews the theoretical contents that led to the formation of World Bank Group. Second, it reconciles the existing operation of the World Bank Group with original thinking of its establishments. Third, it provides lesson from its theoretical mistakes for aspiring Monetary Union in Africa.
The remaining part of the paper is broken into four segments. Next it starts with segment two -the synopsis of the literature review, followed by lesson learnt and concluding remarks in segment three.
Review of Related Literature
The theoretical game proposition that led to the formation of the World Bank Group was rooted in two independent proposals presented by two celebrated Economists in international economics negotiation.
Keynesian Hypothesis of International Monetary System
The first proposal was presented by British economist, John Maynard Keynes. Keynes proposed the establishment of an international clearing union, based on international bank money, called Bancor, fixed in term of gold and accepted as the equivalent of gold by the British Commonwealth, the United State and all members of the Union for settling international balances (Keynes, 1980) . De Vegh (1943) summaries Keynes proposal thus: (a) an instrument of international currency to make bilateral arrangement superfluous;
(b) an order to determine exchange rate values; (c) a stabilizing mechanism to exert pressure on countries whose payment systems tend to become unbalanced, (d) quantum of international currency that is subject to deliberate expansion and contraction (World Monetary Policy);
(e) a central institution to support other international institutions; (f) persuasive instrument for stock of reserve, which is crucial for world trade; (g) a means of ensuring that methods of restriction and trade discrimination will be unnecessary.
Based on the above plan, Keynes suggested that the founding countries should agree on a value of their currency in terms of Bancor and in terms of gold.
Keynes further suggested method of correcting macroeconomic imbalance where countries in surplus must take measures to reduce their surpluses if it exceeds one half of it quota in average one-year including:
(i) measures for expansion of domestic credits and domestic demand;
(ii) the appreciation of local currency in terms of Bancor; (iii) the reduction of tariffs and other discouragement against import; (iv) international loan development for backward countries.
One key contribution of this proposal is that it sets in motion the establishment of the World Central Bank (IMF) on one hand, while it logically provided countries with surplus the option to store value at the Clearing Union without a deflationary and contractionary pressure on the world trade (World Bank, 2000).
White Hypothesis of International Monetary System
The second proposal was presented by American minister of state in the U.S. treasury, Harry Dexter White. White's proposal was based on the structure of the exchange stabilization fund that was used by the USA in 1933 to devalue gold. It was designed for repurchase agreements of gold through currency swapping rather than provide loans to deficit countries to address the macroeconomic imbalance (Boughton, 2006) . Like Keynes, White was more concerned with exchange rate stability and political benefits that could allow the United State become dominance in the world currency monopoly. It was also obvious from White's proposal that US interest were more of investment orientation than trade. This also reflected in White's suggestion on the need for the dollar as the unit of account in the system.
Obviously, these two proposals have created our indulgence to the key problems affecting international monetary system that is yet to be addressed as far as existing literature is concern. First is the politics of gold, convertible currencies, and general balances that remained unsettled in existing studies. Second is the balance of payment disequilibria experienced among countries that led to stringent formation of trade blocs and protectionism policies. Third is the politics of liquidity management as well as varied exchange rate practice (IMF, 2013).
Evidence of Economic Thinking and Politics of Self Interest
Keynes' view was based on the difference between reserve holding and money creation. Keynes suggested that foreign reserves can serve as remedy for offsetting disparities in exchange rate without affecting world trade or being subjected to inflationary pressure. Keynes International Clearing Union (ICU) also envisioned the danger of liquidity crises and suggested an expansionary monetary policy rather than contractionary option. On a second outlook, White's proposal was favored because it was not only politically motivated but was packaged to exploit the developing countries. As such, it was characterized by monopolistic tendencies of currency dominance.
Lessons for Survival of Africa Monetary Union
Africa, since independence, has seen a series of economic integration programs aimed at breaking the poverty trap affecting its growth potential, through promotion of regional trade and enhancing economies of scale in production and distribution. As part of the efforts being promoted, several regional monetary integration initiatives are presently being considered within the continent. In West Africa for instance, the Economic Community of West African States (Ecowas) has since its formation had the objective of constructing a free trade area and single currency union.
The absence of cogent progress on the latter led to a subset of Ecowas countries to propose a second monetary zone -this in addition to the existing CFA franc zone in West Africa, known in English as WAEMU-as a fast track to the creation of the unified West African monetary zone.
As it stands today, the blueprint for African Monetary Union already existed but lessons from the International Monetary System can serve as guide for achieving this aspiration, even though there are many obstacles to contend with. The aspired African Monetary Union needs to understand that appropriate exchange rate policy is crucial for it formation.
Likewise, the need to consider a multi-currency system where the key reserve currencies share the burden of adjustment that come with the role. To avoid skyrocketing inflation, monetary stability must be given utmost priority to enhance cooperation and coordination among members.
Also, the danger of deflation must equally be averted to avoid countries being in default position. The Union must recognize that world economy is prone to episodes of strong volatility and market disruption, as such, all macroeconomic indicators and domesticated monetary policies must be well coordinated.
Conclusion
The creators of the Bretton Wood System failed to acknowledge economic considerations in the earlier thought as it is being discussed today. No doubt, successes have been recorded based on victorious power in international negotiation without due considerations for macroeconomic consequences.
This study has demonstrated that some of the excessive economic pleasure that the US continued to enjoy are reflections of the poverty experienced in developing countries. Therefore, if African Monetary Policy must survive, the lessons from Bretton Wood Conference cannot be ignored.
